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DEBUNKING TWOMBLY/IQBAL: PLAUSIBILITY IS MORE THAN 
PLAUSIBLE IN OHIO AND OTHER STATES 
Matthew Marino* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to justice is a cornerstone of the American judicial system.1 
Although justice is promoted through wide access to the courts, this 
interest must be balanced to prevent lawsuits that are frivolous, revenge-
seeking, or unreasonable.2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) 
provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”3 In Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly,4 the Supreme Court abruptly departed from the longstanding 
“notice pleading” standard developed for Rule 8(a)(2) fifty years earlier 
in Conley v. Gibson. The Conley standard was lenient and justified a 
complaint’s dismissal only if “no set of facts” could be shown to 
demonstrate a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.5 The Court in Twombly set 
a more stringent standard to govern complaints, holding antitrust 
plaintiffs alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act must plead 
sufficient factual matter to support a plausible claim for relief.6 The 
Supreme Court subsequently extended Twombly to all civil cases in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal in 2009.7  
A major policy motive behind the Twombly/Iqbal standard 
(“Twombly/Iqbal”) is to protect defendants from burdensome discovery 
requests, especially from plaintiffs who rely almost exclusively on 
discovery to uncover whether their claims have merit.8 “Plausibility” 
therefore requires a complaint to set out “enough facts to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of a claim for 
relief.9 This has become more relevant with the advent of e-discovery, 
where the use of evidence from large, electronically stored databases has 
 
* Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. See Hon. Earl Johnson Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United 
States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 84 (citing REGINALD HERBER 
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919)).  
 2. See Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 12 GEO 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 909 (2000-2001).  
 3. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).   
 4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 5. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).  
 6. Id. at 556.  
 7. 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009). 
 8. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing Car Carriers v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th 
Cir. 1984)). 
 9. See id. at 556. 
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become both necessary and commonplace, making discovery more costly 
and time-consuming.10  
State courts remain free to follow notice pleading, and indeed most 
state courts still follow some form of the Conley standard.11 Some Ohio 
courts have adopted Twombly/Iqbal while others have either not decided 
or expressly rejected plausibility, suggesting the issue is ripe for the Ohio 
Supreme Court.12  
This Comment argues that the Ohio Supreme Court should adopt 
Twombly/Iqbal. Although Twombly/Iqbal is more stringent than notice 
pleading, implementing Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states will not 
impair access to the courts as many fear,13 but rather will serve benefits 
by encouraging more factually precise complaints and motions at the 
initial pleading stages of a lawsuit. This will lead to more viable 
complaints, better case management, and clearer expectations for 
practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated with early pre-
trial litigation. Adoption of the standard in Ohio also comports with 
Ohio’s tradition of modeling its own rules of procedure after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) and relying on federal case 
law to interpret those rules. Further, plausibility does not mark a drastic 
departure from notice pleading because it has long been implicitly 
embedded in early pre-trial litigation.  
This Comment will proceed as follows. First, Section II will discuss 
how states have modeled their own procedural rules after the Federal 
Rules, examine whether states should rely on federal law at all, and 
outline Ohio’s tradition of modeling its own rules of civil procedure after 
the Federal Rules and using federal case law to interpret those rules. 
Section II will also dissect Twombly/Iqbal in its entirety. Sections II-C, 
II-D, and II-E will serve as a guide for practitioners seeking to understand 
Twombly/Iqbal. Next, Section III will argue that adoption of 
Twombly/Iqbal comports with Ohio’s tradition of adopting federal 
procedural law. Section III will also respond to opponents’ concerns 
surrounding state court adoption of the Twombly/Iqbal. Section IV will 
conclude that Twombly/Iqbal is as sensible in application as it is in theory, 
 
 10. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond The Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 322 
(2008). 
 11. See Darcy Jalandoni & David Shouvlin, Ohio and Twombly/Iqbal: Plausible? OHIO LAW. 
(Ohio State Bar Ass’n), May/June 2015, at 26 (“Inasmuch as Twombly/Iqbal dealt with procedural issues, 
state courts are not bound to follow their rulings under the Erie Doctrine, and most have not. By our recent 
count, of the 12 state supreme courts that have substantively examined Twombly/Iqbal, only three—
Massachusetts, Nebraska and South Dakota—have adopted the plausibility standard or something akin to 
it. Nevada has declined to decide. The remaining states have declined to shift from established basic notice 
pleading principles to the plausibility requirement. They are Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia.”). Id.  
 12. See infra notes 135-138. 
 13. See infra notes 144-146. 
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reasserting that Ohio and other state courts should adopt Twombly/Iqbal 
to promote pretrial litigants’ best interests.   
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section will raise questions surrounding the efficacy of state court 
adoption of federal procedural law as well as the general workability of 
Twombly/Iqbal. First, Part A of this Section will outline the debate over 
whether states should adopt or rely on federal procedural law at all, 
beginning with a discussion of the Federal Rules, the extent to which 
states have adopted the Federal Rules, and whether it is wise for states to 
adopt the Federal Rules. Next, Part B will outline Ohio’s tradition of 
adopting federal procedural law. Parts C and D will then discuss Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, respectively. Finally, Part E 
will discuss the aftermath of Twombly/Iqbal.  
A. Controversy over State Adoption of Federal Procedural Law 
The Federal Rules were adopted in 1937 to provide uniform rules of 
procedure for all federal courts, to simplify pleading, and to provide more 
uniformity in civil litigation.14 Professor Scott Dodson, an expert on civil 
procedure and Associate Dean of Research at the University of California 
Hastings School of Law, explained how the Federal Rules were strongly 
criticized by some members of the legal community after their initial 
promulgation.15 Dodson described how one commentator “repeatedly 
admonished that the national legal community was an amalgam of 
different local legal practices and cultures that should not be forcibly 
unified.”16  
Nonetheless, within a generation, most states had substantially adopted 
the Federal Rules as a model for their own reforms.17 A study conducted 
in 1986 concluded that all state procedure in some way reflected the 
Federal Rules, and twenty-three states had procedural regimes so similar 
to the Federal Rules that they were deemed “replica” states.18 Dodson 
suggested that the “gravitational force of federal law” can explain state 
adoption of federal law despite there being no requirement to do so.19 This 
refers to the general presumption that federal law is good law and should 
 
 14. See Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 548 (Ohio 2016).  
 15. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 708 (2016). 
 16. Id. at 709. 
 17. Id. at 709-10.  
 18. Id. at 708 (Citing John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A 
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1986)). 
 19. Id. at 706. 
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be followed.20 
For instance, a strong argument in favor of the adoption of federal 
procedural law is the quality of the process for amending federal rules.21 
The Federal Rules are reviewed by numerous committees, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress.22 These review processes include public hearings 
and opportunities for advocates to offer oral or written testimony on the 
rules.23 Most states cannot afford these costly processes.24 Therefore, it 
may seem that the Federal Rules are of higher quality because the federal 
government has more resources.25 Further, Supreme Court opinions are a 
product of “deliberative and solemn processes” whereby expert advocates 
brief and argue issues of strong national importance.26 Moreover, interest 
groups and practitioners are welcomed to produce and file amicus briefs.27 
These processes suggest that federal law may reflect a wider-reaching 
consensus regarding universally-shared policy goals.28 
Although federal law may seem alluring in this regard, Dodson 
explained that there are convincing reasons why state courts should not 
follow federal case law or adopt federal statutes. The following 
illuminates Dodson’s concerns surrounding state adoption of federal 
procedural rules absent thoughtful deliberation of the policy goals to be 
served by those rules: 
Federal dockets have different cases and different caseloads. Federal 
judges have life tenure and are less sensitive to local pressures. State 
judges are under greater docket congestion and resource pressures 
than federal judges. Different sets of attorneys appear in the different 
courts. These differences may suggest that a state rule should be 
interpreted in light of particular state contexts and norms, even if 
that results in an interpretation that diverges from the interpretation 
given in an identically worded federal rule.29 
Dodson argued that federal law is adopted at the state level simply 
because it is federal law,30 not because states “exercised rigorous 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not 
Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 502 
(2016). 
 22. Id. at 502.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 503.  
 27. Id.  
 28. See id.  
 29. Dodson, supra note 15, at 711. 
 30. See id. at 715 (arguing states get caught in the “Supreme Court’s gravitational pull” and decide 
without sufficient deliberation to adopt Supreme Court precedent). Id. 
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independent judgment in accordance with state law and policy,”31 
suggesting that blind adoption of federal procedural law is unwise and 
threatens federalism.  
B. Ohio’s Tradition of Adopting Federal Procedural Law 
In drafting the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Ohio Rules”) in 
1968, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the Rules Advisory Committee to 
use the Federal Rules as a model.32 This was a "distinct advantage," as 
other states had modeled their own rules of civil procedure after the 
Federal rules, and there was "a considerable body of decisions" applying 
the Federal Rules.33 By 1986, Ohio was the first of the ten most populous 
U.S. states at the time to have substantially modeled its own rules of civil 
procedure after the Federal Rules, moving before major states like New 
York and California.34 The underlying philosophies behind the Federal 
Rules and the Ohio Rules are largely the same, and many provisions are 
identical.35  
1. Class actions 
Ohio Rule 23 was originally modeled after Federal Rule 23, both of 
which govern class certification in class action lawsuits.36 The policy goal 
of both Federal Rule 23 and Ohio Rule 23 was to open the judicial system 
to more people through the class action mechanism.37 In Grubbs v. Rine, 
the Ohio Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County denied certification 
of a proposed class under Ohio Rule 23(B)(3), basing its determination 
on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee notes to Federal Rule 23 and 
federal case law.38  
In Grubbs, the proposed class included tenants alleging common 
injuries resulting from various misrepresentations made through oral 
 
 31. Id.  
 32. Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 549 (Ohio 2016). 
 33. Id. at 550 (citing Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO ST. BAR 
ASSN. REP. 727, 728 (1970)).  
 34. See Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 513 (citing John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The 
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61WASH L. REV. 
1367, 1428 (1986)) (data revealed New York, Illinois, California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, North 
Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia were still non-replica jurisdictions). Id. 
 35. Alvin W. Lasher, The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and Their Effect on Real Property Titles, 
4 AKRON L. REV. 47, 49 (2015).  
 36. Grubbs v. Rine, 315 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23; 
OHIO. CIV. R. P. 23. 
 37. Grubbs, 315 N.E.2d at 836. 
 38. See id. at 832.  
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contracts with their landlord.39 Both Federal Rule 23(b)(3) and Ohio Rule 
23(B)(3) require that questions of law or fact common to the proposed 
class members predominate over questions affecting only individual 
members.40 Because the proposed members’ claims all depended on 
different oral contracts with their landlord, the court held the class action 
device was inappropriate because the common claims of the class 
members did not predominate over their more particularized claims.41 
In Grubbs, the court cited the Federal Rules Advisory Committee note 
to Federal Rule 23(b)(3), which provided that “a fraud case may be 
unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in 
the representations made.”42 The court also cited a United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania opinion explaining that 
when oral misrepresentations varied between class members and would 
have to be individually proven for each member, the court would have to 
deny class action status.43 Relying on these authorities, the court applied 
the predominance requirement and prevented certification of the class.44 
Resolving every member’s individual contract dispute with the landlord 
through the class action device would not have promoted “economies of 
time, effort, and expense,” as the drafters of Federal Rule 23 envisioned.45 
The predominance requirement prevents class certification when 
proposed members’ claims would better be resolved in individual 
lawsuits.46  
2.   Discovery  
The adoption of Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) was influenced by the federal 
work product doctrine.47 Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) carves out an exception for 
discovery requests for documents and materials prepared in reasonable 
anticipation of litigation.48 The Supreme Court developed this standard in 
Hickman v. Taylor, where the Court recognized and established a 
privilege for an attorney’s written statements or materials used in 
preparation for trial.49 This became known as the work product doctrine. 
Ohio courts subsequently adopted the work product doctrine to promote 
 
 39. Id. at 836.  
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); OHIO CIV. R. 23(B)(3). 
 41. Grubbs, 315 N.E.2d at 840.  
 42. Id. at 836 (citing 1966 Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23).  
 43. Id. at 836 (citing Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973)).  
 44. Id. at 840. 
 45. Id. at 836 (citing 1966 Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23).  
 46. See id. at 836 (citing Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973)). 
 47. See Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 541 (Ohio 2016). 
 48. OHIO CIV. R. 26. 
 49. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
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the same important policy goal—protecting an attorneys’ mental 
processes in preparation for litigation from unjustified access by opposing 
counsel.50   
Ohio Rule 26 mirrors the Federal Rules in other significant ways. For 
instance, the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule 26(b)(1) provided that 
“parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is 
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of 
the case.”51 Requiring discovery requests proportional to the needs of a 
case encourages lawyers to tailor more specifically their discovery 
demands based on the specific facts and stakes of the case.52 Similarly, 
Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) was amended in 2020 to include the italicized 
language requiring proportionality in discovery requests, acknowledging 
the need for discovery limitations in an era of increasingly complex civil 
litigation.53  
Further, Ohio Rule 26(B)(6)(b) provides a mechanism for a party to 
recover inadvertently produced documents from an opponent, which was 
also previously adopted in the Federal Rules.54 Recognizing the need for 
procedural reform incident to the advent of e-discovery, this “claw-back” 
provision allows litigants to keep confidential documents that were 
accidentally disclosed as a result of discovery.55 Accidental disclosure is 
all the more likely in the age of e-discovery where thousands of 
documents may be requested at a time from electronic databases.56  
As made evident, Ohio has adopted and amended its own rules of civil 
procedure to reflect the Federal Rules and federal case law, and the Ohio 
Rules Advisory Committees and Ohio courts have emphasized the same 
important policy goals envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules.57  
C. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007) 
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly held antitrust plaintiffs 
alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act must plead sufficient 
factual matter to support a plausible claim for relief.58 The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 required large telephone carriers to 
share their networks with smaller carriers.59 Many consumers believed 
 
 50. See Burnham, 89 N.E.3d at 541.  
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 52. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 357-58 (emphasis added). 
 53. See OHIOCIV. R. 26, staff note (2020).  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 329. 
 57. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text. 
 58. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). 
 59. Id.  
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that the larger carriers conspired to eliminate competition between the 
smaller carriers.60 William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus brought suit 
against Bell Atlantic Corporation, Verizon Communications, and other 
large carriers on behalf of all telephone users for violating Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.61 Plaintiffs alleged the defendants were conspiring with 
one another to keep prices high and force smaller carriers out of 
business.62 Plaintiffs did not have evidence of an agreement to conspire, 
but they had evidence of parallel conduct between all of the defendant 
carriers, such as treating smaller competitors unfairly and refraining from 
doing business in one another’s respective territory.63  
Defendants argued that evidence of parallel conduct alone could not 
survive a motion to dismiss, as Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires 
all plaintiffs to clearly state why they are entitled to relief.64 Plaintiffs 
argued that their complaint was sufficient under Conley v. Gibson, where 
the Supreme Court held that a complaint should provide notice of the 
lawsuit to the defendant and should only be dismissed if “no set of facts” 
could possibly be proven to support the claim; hence: notice pleading.65 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court’s determination that the complaint was insufficient.66  
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter devised a new standard to 
govern Rule 8(a)(2), providing that a complaint must contain enough facts 
to make the allegations plausible on their face and not merely 
speculative.67 Justice Souter explained that a complaint cannot be 
plausible if it only contains conclusory allegations, recites labels, or lists 
the elements of a claim.68 Justice Souter cautioned that plausibility does 
not require a complaint to contain overly-detailed factual allegations, but 
there must be some facts to demonstrate a claim for relief:  
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a 
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough 
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal agreement. And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed 
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is 
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.69  
 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 550. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 550-51. 
 64. Id. at 553.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 555. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 556 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted). 
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The Court further reasoned that dismissing implausible complaints 
saves time, money, and resources by dispensing quickly with groundless 
claims, especially in the context of an expensive and time-consuming 
antitrust lawsuit.70 Justice Souter explained that the plaintiffs’ claims did 
not meet the plausibility standard because parallel conduct alone was not 
enough to demonstrate that the defendants actually agreed to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior.71 Therefore, it was implausible that evidence of 
such an agreement would become available upon discovery.72  
Further, the court explained that judges and commentators have not 
interpreted the Conley v. Gibson “no set of facts” language under the 
Conley standard in its literal terms.73 To the Twombly majority, Conley 
did not merely require that any set of facts may be used to support a claim, 
but rather, that any set of facts could be used once the claim had been 
sufficiently pled, so long as those facts were consistent with the elements 
of the claim.74  
Justice Stevens dissented, criticizing the majority for reading a 
plausibility standard into Rule 8(a)(2), stressing that the purpose of a 
liberal pleading standard in the Federal Rules is to keep litigants in court 
so they have a chance to test the merits of their claims after collecting 
evidence through discovery.75 Justice Stevens also explained that the 
costs of discovery in expensive and complex antitrust litigation could be 
avoided with better case management, careful scrutiny when ruling on 
motions for summary judgment, and clear jury instructions.76 Justice 
Stevens concluded that parallel conduct is circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to state a claim for relief when bringing a claim of conspiracy 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the majority overstepped its 
boundaries in imposing a plausibility requirement under Rule 8(a)(2).77 
D. Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal extended Twombly to all civil 
cases, holding that a complaint must allege nonconclusory facts that, 
taken as true, support a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.78 In 
the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Javaid Iqbal was 
 
 70. Id. at 573.  
 71. Id. at 559. 
 72. See id.  
 73. Id. at 562. 
 74. Id. at 563.  
 75. Id. at 575. 
 76. Id. at 573. 
 77. See id. at 585-86.  
 78. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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arrested on fraud charges and deemed high risk under the Bush 
Administration’s policy of isolating prisoners who may be terrorist 
threats.79 He was subject to harsh conditions in prison.80 Iqbal filed a 
lawsuit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert 
Mueller alleging that enforcement of the anti-terrorism policy 
discriminated against him by subjecting him to harsh detention conditions 
based on his religion, race, and/or national origin.81 Ashcroft and Mueller 
filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court denied, finding that 
Iqbal had pled sufficient allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.82 The 
United States Supreme Court approved certiorari after the Court of 
Appeals upheld the District Court’s ruling.83 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy applied Twombly and found 
that Iqbal had not pled sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible 
claim for relief.84 Kennedy found that Iqbal’s complaint was conclusory, 
and the facts he did allege did not support a reasonable inference of 
discrimination.85 Kennedy found that Iqbal’s claim was “nothing more 
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
discrimination claim,” assuming the petitioners had adopted the post-911 
policy “because of, ‘not merely in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.”86 Therefore, the majority held that Iqbal did not state 
a plausible claim for relief.87  
The majority also held that Twombly was not limited to antirust cases 
and applied to all civil actions, explaining that the plausibility requirement 
resembled a sensible middle ground for a pleading standard:   
The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with 
a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of entitlement to relief.88  
The majority also emphasized that pleading sufficient facts is essential 
in claims against government officials, because lawsuits are time-
consuming and divert officeholders’ attention away from serving the 
 
 79. Id. at 666.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 678. 
 85. Id. at 681. 
 86. Id. (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 87. Id. at 685. 
 88. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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public.89  
Justice Souter dissented, arguing Iqbal’s complaint was not conclusory 
because it properly stated a discrimination claim on its face under 
Twombly.90 Justice Souter continued by asserting that nonconclusory 
allegations should be accepted as true unless completely unrealistic, 
which confusingly seemed to err on the side of possibility rather than 
plausibility.91   
E. The Aftermath of Twombly/Iqbal 
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions prompted immediate controversy.92 
Congress even pursued legislation in 2009 that would have returned 
pleading to the Conley standard.93 The lenient Conley standard reflected 
the principles that: (1) complaints serve the simple function of putting 
defendants on notice of the claims against them, and (2) the merits of a 
claim should not be decided at the pleading stage, but rather through the 
pre-trial discovery and summary judgment devices.94 As these ideas 
became hallmarks of open access to justice through federal and state court 
systems, the abrupt departure from the Conley standard catalyzed a 
firestorm of research discussing the implications of heightened pleading 
requirements under Twombly/Iqbal. 
The context in which Twombly and Iqbal were both decided may 
suggest the Court was imprudent in extending plausibility to all civil cases 
with such haste.95 The Court in Twombly reasoned plausibility was 
necessary in the context of expensive and time-consuming antitrust 
litigation.96 Similarly, the Court in Iqbal reasoned plausibility was 
necessary to insulate government officials from burdensome litigation, 
which distracts them from their official duties.97 These facts suggest that 
extending plausibility to all civil cases, where many of these concerns do 
not always exist, may have been unwise.98 
 
 89. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685. 
 90. Id. at 690.  
 91. Id.  
 92. See RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, & JAMES 
E. PFANDER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 198 (West Academic Publishing 7th 
ed. 2018). 
 93. Id.  
 94. Alana C. Jochum, Pleading in Ohio after Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Why 
Ohio Shouldn’t Notice a Change, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 516 (2010) (citing Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008)).  
 95. See Danielle Lusardo Schantz, Access to Justice: Impact of Twombly & Iqbal on State Court 
Systems, 51 AKRON L. REV. 951, 984 (2018). 
 96. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007).  
 97. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009). 
 98. See Schantz, supra note 95, at 984.  
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As of 2018, out of the thirty state jurisdictions that have modeled in 
large part their own rules after the Federal Rules, twelve state supreme 
courts have considered adoption of Twombly/Iqbal.99 Five of those 
jurisdictions have chosen to follow Twombly/Iqbal, while the other seven 
have maintained notice pleading.100 Studies have been largely 
inconclusive surrounding the effects of Twombly/Iqbal.101 One thing is 
certain, however—"implementation of [Twombly and Iqbal] can hardly 
be characterized as seamless or without objections,” leading to difficulties 
for practitioners and litigants in early pleading.102 
Albeit vague, Twombly created some expectation of what a viable 
complaint requires: (1) the complaint must provide grounds of the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, which requires “more than labels and 
conclusions;” (2) simply alleging the elements of a cause of action is not 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss; (3) more speculative allegations 
will be viewed with more scrutiny; and (4) the complaint must include 
factual allegations presenting “plausible grounds” indicating that the 
pleader is entitled to relief, or at least that discovery will reveal evidence 
of a claim for relief.103  
Aside from extending Twombly to all civil cases, Iqbal added little to 
the understanding of plausibility.104 The majority in Iqbal was unclear as 
to why Iqbal’s complaint was conclusory, noting Federal Rule 8 
 
 99. Id. at 964-65.  
 100. Id. at 965 (Colorado, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Dakota have all 
adopted plausibility, whereas Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and 
Washington have chosen to maintain notice pleading).  
 101. William Hubbard, The Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 1, 2 (Coase-Sandor Working 
Paper Series in Law & Econ. No. 773, 2016). 
 102. See Jochum, supra note 94, at 516-20 (citing NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 
2007) (Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that “a naked assertion of antitrust injury is insufficient to state a claim 
under the Sherman Act, and evidence of agreements between competitors alone cannot demonstrate 
plausibility of anti-competitive behavior.”)); Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., 276 F. App'x 473 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(In a diversity case involving allegations of consumer protection violations, the Sixth Circuit arguably 
applied the plausibility requirement despite its confusing use of the “no set of facts” language in Conley, 
ultimately holding that the plaintiff had not set out enough facts to demonstrate that the disputed 
transactions were “commercial transactions” for purposes of the statutory violations); Huffman v. City of 
Willoughby, 2007-Ohio-7120 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
a motion to dismiss, citing the Conley language, and asserting “because it is so easy for the pleader to 
satisfy the standard of Ohio Civ. R. 8(A), few complaints are subject to dismissal” (quoting Id.); Gallo v. 
Westfield Nat'l Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals was the 
first Ohio court to apply a limited form of the plausibility standard); Williams v. Ohio Edison, 2009-Ohio-
5702 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals applied the limited form of the plausibility 
standard to affirm a granted motion to dismiss in a case involving a pro se plaintiff who had drafted a 
mess of a complaint alleging employment violations).  
 103. See Richard O. Holloran, The Fact of the Matter: A Return to Fact Pleading? Viable 
Complaints After Twombly, 44 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 24 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557 (2007)). 
 104. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 861 (2010).  
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“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation.”105 However, Professor Roger G. Bone, a leading scholar on 
civil procedure and complex litigation, described how Iqbal’s complaint 
was viable under plausibility because it described mental states and linked 
those mental states to a discriminatory policy described in some detail 
elsewhere throughout the complaint.106 The complaint described how 
Ashcroft and Mueller:  
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to impose harsh 
conditions on the plaintiff as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest, 
and that Ashcroft was the principal architect of this policy and Mueller 
oversaw its execution.107  
Bone argued that although these mental states were described with 
conventional terminology, it is “not clear what other language the plaintiff 
could have used and still conveyed his meaning clearly.”108  
To add to the confusion, Justice Souter dissented in Iqbal despite his 
majority authorship in Twombly, arguing that the allegations in Iqbal’s 
complaint were actually quite specific when read in the context of the 
complaint as a whole.109 Justice Souter interpreted plausibility more 
leniently than the majority in Iqbal, raising serious questions as to the 
proper interpretation of plausibility.110 Professor Bone argued that the 
conflict between the majority and dissent in their conceptions of 
“plausible” does nothing to guide the “generality-specificity 
continuum.”111 In other words, Iqbal drew an even murkier line between 
what separates a plausible and implausible complaint that would be viable 
under Twombly/Iqbal.112  
III. DISCUSSION  
This Section argues that Ohio and other state courts should adopt 
Twombly/Iqbal. Part A of this Section will discuss why it is reasonable 
for state courts to adopt federal procedural law. Part B will contemplate 
the difficulty of producing an equitable and just pleading standard and 
explain how plausibility is a sensible middle ground. Next, Part C will 
argue that Ohio and other similarly situated states should adopt 
 
 105. Id. at 859.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 861. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
13
Marino: Debunking Twombly/Iqbal
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
2021] DEBUNKING TWOMBLY/IQBAL 1079 
Twombly/Iqbal to serve important policy goals, encourage more viable 
complaints, facilitate better case management, and provide clearer 
expectations for practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated 
with early pre-trial litigation. Finally, Part D will respond to arguments 
against the adoption of Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states.  
A. Federal Procedural Law Should Not be Discounted at the State Level 
Professor Emeritus Stephen S. Subrin and Professor Thomas Main, 
both leading experts in the field of civil procedure, have argued that a 
major reason why states replicate federal procedural law is to “provide 
uniformity, making it easier for judges, lawyers, law professors, and law 
students to master civil procedure by studying and utilizing only one 
procedural regime.”113 The scholars contended that providing uniformity 
is not a good reason to adopt federal procedural law and that the 
sensibility of adopting federal procedural law at the state level should be 
viewed with more scrutiny.114 
Subrin and Main observed a “pro-defendant” spirit arising in the 
Federal Rules in recent amendments, which they attribute to the increased 
presence of large law firms and corporate attorneys on the Rules Advisory 
Committees in recent decades.115 The authors explained how the drafters 
created a “big business” narrative that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been 
abusing an overly-liberal civil litigation system.116 However, this view 
fails to consider the pro-plaintiff spirit of the early Federal Rules and case 
law that explains the need to respond with pro-defendant rules. 
 Subrin and Main failed to acknowledge one of the most significant 
transformations in civil procedure since the promulgation of the Federal 
Rules that weighs monumentally in favor of plaintiffs—ease in obtaining 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. This was necessary in light of 
the expansion of U.S. interstate commerce, which led to an increased 
likelihood that a producer’s goods or services would injure someone in a 
different state.117 In McGee v. International Life Insurance, the Supreme 
Court held an insurance company with only one customer in the forum 
state could be subject to that state’s jurisdiction based on that single 
contact.118 Coincidentally enough, McGee and Conley were both decided 
in 1957 and both represented major victories for plaintiffs. The pro-
defendant spirit of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules criticized 
 
 113. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 517.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 518.  
 116. Id. 
 117. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). 
 118. Id. at 223. 
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by Subrin and Main should be understood as a limitation of the pro-
plaintiff jurisprudence of the mid-twentieth century, such as Conley and 
McGee, rather than an attempt by big business rule drafters to quash 
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Federal Rules should not be viewed as a threat 
to state court systems because of its pro-defendant spirit in recent decades, 
but rather a response to changing needs of U.S. courts, which have 
become flooded with litigation in more recent decades119 incident to the 
expansion of interstate commerce. 
Pro-plaintiff jurisprudence remained on the federal circuit despite what 
Subrin and Main have described as the “anti-civil litigation” mentality 
characteristic of the time periods throughout the Rehnquist and Roberts 
courts.120 In Kozlowski v. Sears, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts held businesses to a higher record-keeping 
standard in order to ensure plaintiffs’ access to documents upon 
discovery.121 In Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, the Seventh Circuit 
held that plaintiff’s counsel’s interviews with nonparty witnesses before 
trial were not subject to Rule 32 deposition requirements, which would 
have required opposing counsel and a court reporter to be present.122 This 
allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect evidence from non-party witnesses 
without the burden of following formal deposition requirements.  
As discussed above, Subrin and Main argued that the recent 
amendments to the rules were the product of a false narrative, espoused 
by the pro-business rule drafters, that plaintiffs’ attorneys were abusing 
civil litigation.123 The authors relied on the rule drafters’ characterization 
of discovery as becoming extremely large and complex in civil litigation, 
despite the lack of empirical support for this claim.124 Therefore, the 
authors reasoned that adoption of provisions like the 2015 amendment to 
Federal Rule 26(b)(1), requiring discovery demands proportional to the 
needs of the case, were unnecessary.125  
However, there is reason to believe that discovery will become 
increasingly complex and burdensome in state courts as e-discovery 
becomes more prevalent.126 E-discovery and discovery abuses are not 
exclusive to the high value, prominent lawsuits that arise in the federal 
courts.127 Most litigation takes place in state courts; and because most 
 
 119. Judiciary Makes the Case for New Judgeships, U.S. COURTS (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/06/30/judiciary-makes-case-new-judgeships.  
 120. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 518.  
 121. 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976). 
 122. 388 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 123. Subrin &Main, supra note 21, at 518.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 333.  
 127. Id.  
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Americans now utilize email and rely on computers for a variety of 
activities, e-discovery is just as likely in state courts as it is in the federal 
courts.128 The history of federal procedural law also suggests that e-
discovery is not a big-city phenomenon, as the first federal district courts 
to have local rules concerning e-discovery were in Arkansas and 
Wyoming.129 Even if state adoption of federal procedural rules may prove 
inconsequential in the short run because discovery is already largely 
under control in state courts, as Subrin and Main suggest, it may be highly 
consequential in the long run by prospectively addressing the issues that 
arise incident to the increasing presence of complex litigation and e-
discovery in state courts. 
Lastly, in his essay arguing against state court adoption of federal 
procedural rules, Professor Dodson conceded that state courts are under 
larger docket congestion.130 This suggests that the recent amendments 
embodying the “pro-defendant” spirit may actually help larger and more 
populous states monitor plaintiff behavior that leads to docket congestion. 
B. The Pleading Conundrum 
Developing a workable pleading standard is troublesome. For instance, 
when complaints require litigants to show only possible entitlement to 
relief, it would ostensibly lead to a gross influx of complaints and little 
flexibility to screen for illegitimate claims.131 Even the most far-fetched 
and elaborate theory of a case is possible. For instance, it is possible that 
a plaintiff’s neighbors conspired with the National Security 
Administration to spy on him, but this is far from plausible, and allowing 
outlandish cases to proceed to trial would impair access for those with 
legitimate claims deserving adjudication. The antithesis of that is a system 
in which litigants would have to state a probable entitlement to relief, 
which is also undesirable.132 Litigants need discovery to uncover the 
aspects of their claim that would lead to its probability. Requiring 
probability at the outset of the lawsuit would require most evidence to be 
identified prior to discovery, which is plainly inconsistent with the 
purpose of discovery: to collect evidence. Therefore, a golden mean is 
desirable, a standard in between possibility and probability—namely, 
plausibility.133  
 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Dodson, supra note 15, at 711. 
 131. See Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 132. Id.  
 133. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 40 (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins 
trans., University of Chicago Press 2011) (Aristotle stated that virtue is the golden mean between two 
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C. Advocating for Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states 
Twombly/Iqbal opponents have argued that the goals of plausibility 
cannot be realized at the state level and that Twombly/Iqbal as a whole is 
misguided.134 However, these critics have failed to consider how the 
standard may evolve with time to produce favorable results in both federal 
and state courts.  
Rule 8 of the Ohio Rules mirrors Federal Rule 8 and requires a 
complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the party is entitled to relief.”135 The meaning of this statement in 
Ohio is largely unsettled.136 Some Ohio courts have expressly or 
implicitly followed the plausibility standard, while others have expressly 
rejected it.137 This suggests the issue is ripe for the Ohio Supreme 
Court.138  
The Ohio Supreme Court should adopt Twombly/Iqbal. Adoption of 
the standard achieves important policy goals. These goals are common to 
both state and federal courts, including the encouragement of more viable 
complaints, better case management, judicial efficiency, and clearer 
expectations for practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated 
with early pre-trial litigation. Further, plausibility does not mark a drastic 
departure from notice pleading because, on a general scale, it has long 
been implicitly embedded in early pre-trial litigation. 
D. Responding to the arguments against state court adoption of 
Twombly/Iqbal 
Leading experts in civil procedure have identified eight major 
objections to Ohio and other state court adoption of Twombly/Iqbal: (1) 
plausibility is a confusing and inconsistent doctrine;139 (2) litigants are 
unlikely to forum shop for notice pleading jurisdictions;140 (3) federal and 
state uniformity will not be achieved because many replica jurisdictions 
 
vices, “the one of excess and the other of deficiency.” For instance, courage is a virtue because it is a 
sensible middle-ground between cowardice, the vice of deficiency, and rashness, the vice of excess. This 
is Aristotelian virtue theory). Id.  
 134. See Dodson, supra note 15, at 708; Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 518; Jochum, supra note 
94, at 510. Schantz, supra note 95, at 984; Hon. John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set Out 
in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the Needs of the Replica, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 54, 78 (2014). 
 135. Jalandoni & Shouvlin, supra note 11, at 26.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 26-27. 
 139. Jochum, supra note 94, at 525-26; see Schantz, supra note 95, at 984; Sullivan, supra note 
134, at 79-81.  
 140. Jochum, supra note 94, at 524-25. 
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have departed from the Federal Rules in various ways;141 (4) stare decisis 
requires adherence to notice pleading;142 (5) discovery abuses are not a 
concern at the state level;143 (6) there are constitutional concerns 
surrounding the right to a jury trial when the merits of a case are decided 
before the parties get a chance to engage in discovery;144 (7) it is likely 
that cases with merit will be dismissed under Twombly/Iqbal;145 and (8) 
the standard will result in increased costs of drafting complaints and 
litigating motions to dismiss.146 This Part will respond to each of these 
arguments in favor of Ohio and other state court adoption of 
Twombly/Iqbal. 
1. Plausibility is confusing, but future clarity is probable 
The first argument against Ohio and other state court adoption of 
Twombly/Iqbal is that plausibility is a confusing and inconsistent 
doctrine. However, both Twombly and Iqbal were decided just over a 
decade ago. Expecting absolute clarity under a recently adopted Supreme 
Court standard after disrupting fifty years of precedent is plainly 
unreasonable. This does not mean that the standard should be avoided, 
but rather developed and solidified to serve important policy goals and 
provide practitioners a clear picture of what a complaint requires.  
 2.  Plausibility serves more important policy goals than deterring forum 
shopping for notice pleading jurisdictions  
The second argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that 
litigants are unlikely to forum shop for notice pleading jurisdictions. This 
view does not support the argument that state courts should not adopt 
plausibility. The plausibility standard serves more important policy goals 
than deterring forum shopping, such as encouraging attorneys to draft 
more viable complaints, promoting better case management, and creating 
clear expectations for practitioners. 
Viable, well-worded complaints make it easier for defendants and 
judges to anticipate the nature of the case and prepare responses.147 More 
 
 141. Id. at 521-22.   
 142. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983.  
 143. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 517-21; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 88-89.  
 144. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 81-82.  
 145. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 82-84.  
 146. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 526; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 85-86.  
 147. David C. Wilkes, Drafting New York Civil Litigation Documents, 82 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 64 
(2010) (although tailored specifically to drafting complaints in New York, the author explained how these 
rules apply to drafting complaints in all civil litigation, and that “clear, concise, and logical documents set 
the tone to [effectively] interact with opposing counsel.” (alteration added)).  
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effective communication through pleading will also lead to a 
simplification of the discovery process because plaintiffs will have 
already specified the anticipated location of the requested materials, as 
plausibility requires “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence” of a claim for relief.148 This will provide 
defendants more time to prepare for discovery requests. This will not 
burden plaintiffs’ attorneys by requiring them to precisely identify the 
location of evidence, but only the suspected location of evidence.149 
Therefore, the only added requirement that plausibility establishes for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys is more effective communication in early pleading.   
More effective communication in early pleading will also help litigants 
refine and tailor their discovery requests to the demands of their case,150 
which will help litigants comply with Ohio Rule 26(B)(1), requiring 
discovery requests that are proportional to the needs of the case. This will 
also eliminate the need for courts to oversee mandated pre-trial case 
management meetings.151 This is very important because state courts have 
fewer resources than federal courts to expend on the oversight of pre-trial 
matters.152 Adoption of the standard will also create clearer expectations 
for practitioners in states where plausibility has been adopted in some 
jurisdictions and not others.  
3.   Plausibility promotes more than uniformity  
The third argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that federal 
and state uniformity will not be achieved because many replica 
jurisdictions have departed from the Federal Rules in various ways. This 
view does not support the finding that states should not adopt plausibility. 
Twombly/Iqbal will serve other policy goals that are equally if not more 
important than providing for uniformity. These goals are explained 
above.153  
4.   Stare decisis does not require adherence to notice pleading 
The fourth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that stare 
decisis requires adherence to notice pleading. This is not a strong 
 
 148. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).  
 149. See id.  
 150. See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2215 (2014) (describing the Twombly/Iqbal departure from notice pleading 
reduces plaintiffs’ reliance on discovery to uncover evidence to prove their claim, leading to more 
controlled discovery demands proportional to the needs of the case).  
 151. See Holloran, supra note 103, at 20. 
 152. See Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 502.  
 153. See supra Part III(D)(ii).  
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argument. Justice Souter in Twombly explained that a literal reading of 
the Conley “no set of facts” language would result in a system where a 
“wholly conclusory statement of a claim would survive a motion to 
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support 
recovery.”154 The Court explained how, in practice, this was not the case, 
outlining cases where the Conley’s “no set of facts language” had been 
“questioned, criticized, and explained away.”155 
The Court explained, as the Seventh Circuit had previously held, that 
Conley had never been interpreted literally and “[i]n practice, a complaint 
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the 
material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal 
theory.”156 The Court also pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s previous holding 
that there is serious conflict between Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
and the requirement that a plaintiff must provide “grounds” for his or her 
entitlement to relief.157 Further, the Court explained the First Circuit had 
previously stated that Conley does not require a court to speculate as to 
facts not set out in a complaint in order to turn a frivolous claim into a 
substantial one.158 The Court concluded that “Conley, then, described the 
breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not 
the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s 
survival.”159  
Richard Halloran, an experienced litigator at the firm Lewis and Roca 
LLP, reinforced Justice Souter’s assertions, explaining that requiring 
plausibility in a complaint will not drastically alter early pleading:  
Requiring plaintiffs to come forth at the outset with more than mere 
conclusory allegations is nothing new. And ferreting out patently deficient 
pleadings makes sense for both litigants and the judicial system. Requiring 
plaintiffs to come forth in their complaints with enough factual allegations 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence 
entitling them to relief is a minor cost compared with the expenses and 
burdens of litigation noted in Twombly and the strain that rising caseloads 
and tight fiscal constraints have imposed on our courts.160 
Therefore, experience suggests that most attorneys would not have ever 
relied on the actual “no set of facts” standard, and plausibility has already 
 
 154. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.  
 155. Id. at 562.  
 156. Id. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted; emphasis and omission in original)).  
 157. Id. (citing Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 158. Id. (quoting O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
 159. Id. at 563.  
 160. Holloran, supra note 103, at 24.  
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been implicitly embedded in early pre-trial litigation despite the leniency 
suggested by the literal reading of Conley.  
Lastly, Ohio has a long history of adopting federal procedural law.161 
Both the drafters of the Ohio Rules and Ohio courts have expressed 
agreement with the policy goals envisioned by the drafters of the Federal 
Rules.162 These observations suggest that stare decisis does not preclude 
Ohio from adopting Twombly/Iqbal.   
5.   Plausibility is necessary: Excessive discovery demands are not 
exclusive to federal courts  
The fifth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that discovery 
abuses are not a concern at the state level. However, as mentioned, the 
rise of e-discovery will complicate discovery demands in both state and 
federal courts,163 suggesting that Ohio and other states should adopt 
plausibility to ensure that plaintiffs are making an adequate showing of a 
viable claim before burdening defendants with extraordinary discovery 
requests in complex litigation. Further, Ohio is also a large state with a 
large population, where complex litigation and e-discovery are bound to 
arise, resulting in burdensome discovery demands. 
6.   Constitutional issues regarding access to jury trials are no more 
severe under plausibility 
The sixth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that there are 
constitutional concerns surrounding the right to a jury trial when the 
merits of a case are decided before the parties get a chance to engage in 
discovery. This concern is quickly refuted by the majority opinion in 
Twombly outlining the bevy of cases rejecting a literal interpretation of 
the Conley “no set of facts” standard, suggesting that plausibility has long 
been embedded in early pretrial litigation.164 A transition to plausibility 
does no more than solidify a long-adopted pleading practice.165 
7.  Cases with merit will survive motions to dismiss under plausibility  
The seventh argument against Ohio and other state court adoption of 
Twombly/Iqbal is that cases with merit will be dismissed more often under 
plausibility. However, plausibility may actually decrease granted motions 
 
 161. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Marcus, supra notes 126-124 and accompanying text.  
 164. See supra notes 73-68 and accompanying text; notes 156-154 and accompanying text.  
 165. See id.   
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to dismiss in the long run because attorneys will draft more viable, well-
worded complaints. Professor William Hubbard, an expert in civil 
procedure from the University of Chicago Law School, described recent 
studies that found increases in granted motions to dismiss under the 
plausibility standard were given with leave to amend; but there had been 
no change in dismissals with prejudice, which suggested plausibility had 
“little effect on the share of cases effectively terminated by a ruling on a 
motion to dismiss.”166 Professor Hubbard conducted his own statistical 
analysis of recent federal court filings. The following outlines Hubbard’s 
conclusions: 
What I find is a fairly detailed and coherent picture of the effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal. Twombly and Iqbal have led to a greater frequency in 
filings of motions to dismiss and the amendment of complaints. But there 
is little evidence that Twombly or Iqbal precipitated a major change in 
dismissals with prejudice, settlement patterns, or filing rates.167 
Professor Hubbard’s finding that plausibility has not significantly 
increased the number of granted motions to dismiss with prejudice 
suggests that access to the courts will not be compromised under 
plausibility. Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to file amended 
complaints. As practitioners adjust to plausibility, more viable, well-
worded complaints will result at the outset of a lawsuit, leading to a 
reduction in granted motions to dismiss, as well as the need to re-file 
amended complaints.  
8.   Widescale adoption of plausibility will reduce pre-trial costs  
The eighth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that 
plausibility will result in increased costs of drafting complaints and 
litigating motions to dismiss. Professor Hubbard’s finding that 
plausibility has led in some jurisdictions to an increase in granted motions 
to dismiss with leave to amend may suggest that plausibility will create 
higher pre-trial costs for litigants in jurisdictions that adopt 
Twombly/Iqbal, as more complaints will require re-drafting and re-
filing.168 However, this view fails to consider that widescale adoption of 
plausibility will create clearer expectations for practitioners. As discussed 
above, this may decrease the success of motions to dismiss in the long run 
because attorneys will be encouraged to draft more viable, well-worded 
complaints, leading to better communication in early pleading and better 
case management, leading to a reduction in the costs associated with 
 
 166. Hubbard, supra note 101, at 7. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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litigating pre-trial motions.169   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Twombly/Iqbal is as sensible in application as it is in theory. Aristotle 
once stated that virtue is the golden mean between two vices, “the one 
relating to excess, the other to deficiency.”170 Notice pleading represents 
the vice of deficiency: a possibility standard, which makes it too easy to 
get into court. Probability represents the vice of excess, where it is too 
hard to get into court. Plausibility is sensible because it is the middle 
ground. Twombly/Iqbal does not represent an impediment to justice or the 
advent of a “pro-defendant” era of jurisprudence, but rather a response to 
the early pro-plaintiff spirit of jurisprudence after the initial promulgation 
of the Federal Rules. Twombly/Iqbal marks a shift in judicial philosophy 
regarding the purpose of a complaint. Under Twombly/Iqbal, in addition 
to the Conley notice requirement, plaintiffs must communicate detailed 
information in their complaints to prepare the lawyers and judges 
involved for the facts and allegations of the case.  
More effective communication in early pleading is a benefit regardless 
of whether litigants are in state or federal court because it speeds up the 
pretrial process. Scholars have exaggerated the unique characteristics of 
states rendering them unfit for adoption of Twombly/Iqbal. These views 
have failed to consider plausibility’s potential to facilitate better case 
management and more effective communication in early pleading, which 
will speed up litigation and reduce docket congestion. More effective 
communication in early pleading will lead to more viable complaints, 
which will reduce granted motions to dismiss as well as the costs 
associated with litigating them. Therefore, adoption of Twombly/Iqbal 
will not impede access to the courts. Rather, it will promote important 
policy goals shared by both state and federal court systems. Ohio should 
adopt Twombly/Iqbal to advance these goals.  
 
 169. See supra Part III(D)(vi)-(vii). 
 170. Aristotle, supra note 133.  
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